The correspondence and coherence metatheories use entirely different criteria to judge the truth of a particular theory and the hypotheses, statements, or claims derived from this theory. In fact, these are metatheories or frameworks, rather than theories: they are not themselves testable theories, but can be used to derive substantive theories that can be tested. In line with contemporary philosophy of science, we distinguish two major frameworks that differ in the criteria they use to decide what is true: the correspondence theory of truth (Prior 1967) and the coherence theory of truth (Rescher 2002 White 1967). Second, it enables us to develop a new view of judging diagnostic competence, and we will try to demonstrate that if we can judge diagnostic competence, we can also improve it through education or experience.Ĭorrespondence and coherence theories of truth The consequences of this approach are twofold: first, it enables us to hold different versions of truth, as a consequence of using different criteria, while refraining from philosophical speculation. Rather than speculating whether it makes sense to say that a diagnosis is “true,” it seems more fruitful to focus on the criteria we use to judge whether a diagnosis (or any other medical decision) is true in the sense: correct. Apart from indirect, this knowledge is also fallible, and hence our diagnoses are always more or less uncertain: the world in which we live is characterized by “irreducible uncertainty” (Hammond 1996b). If we hold a belief about a patient’s diagnosis, make a judgment of a patient’s state, or decide on a treatment, how do we know that this belief, judgment, or decision is “true” or “correct”? Or, even more fundamental: What do we mean by “true” when we say, “the true diagnosis was…”? Some philosophers, most notably post-structuralists, will claim there is no such thing as a “true diagnosis.” However, we believe this view to be rather unconstructive and will adopt a more pragmatic stance, i.e., that diseases are entities that exist in the empirical word (“out there”) and that we all-doctors, students, patients, teachers, anyone-can obtain at least indirect knowledge of the presence of a disease through observations-of signs, symptoms, patient behaviors, laboratory values, contextual aspects. In line with Hammond’s view (Med Decis Mak 16(3):281–287, 1996a Human judgment and social policy: irreducible uncertainty, inevitable error, unavoidable injustice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996b), we will extend the two metatheories to two forms of competence: coherence competence and correspondence competence, and demonstrate that distinguishing these two forms of competence increases our insights as to the best way to teach undergraduate students clinical problem solving. We will discuss both the role of both metatheories in medicine, in particular in medical education in a clinical context. The two metatheories supplement each other, but are also incommensurable, i.e., they cannot be expressed in each other’s terms, for they employ completely different criteria to establish truth (Englebretsen in Bare facts and naked truths: a new correspondence theory of truth, Routledge, London, 2005). The second metatheory conceives of truth as correspondence, i.e., empirical accuracy. The first metatheory conceives of truth in terms of coherence (rationality, consistency): a body of knowledge is true when it contains no inconsistencies and has at least some credibility. In this paper, we will first discuss two current meta-theories dealing with different, aspects of “truth”.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |